Given your present beliefs, it logically follows that a necessarily existent Being capable of spontaneous, free action exists.

You believe that every beginning (free actions aside) must have a cause. You also believe that it is possible for there to be a beginning to contingent things. That means it is possible for there to be an event, C, in which all contingent things begin to exist, and something causes that beginning (I’m stipulating that C contains no uncausable, free actions). No contingent thing could possibly cause C, since any contingent thing would be part of C (and no cause can be part of its effect, as I stipulated at the outset). Therefore, the only possible cause of C has to be a non-contingent being, a.k.a., a necessarily existing Being—a being that, by definition, exists in every possible world, if it exists at all.

Now if any possible world had a being that exists in all possible worlds, then that being would exist in the actual world, too (given the modal axiom, S5). It follows that if it is really possible for C to have a cause, then there really is a necessarily existent Being, N.

Now N can cause C by a free action, by a non-free action, or by a non-free non-action. In all three cases, N’s causing C would be a contingent state of affairs, for otherwise C would be necessary, which is a contradiction. Since C contains every contingent thing compatible with it other than free actions, C also includes N’s causing C, unless N’s causing C is a free action. But if C includes N’s causing C, then N could not cause C without causing N’s causing C, which is circular. Therefore, N’s causing C cannot be included in C, which entails that N’s causing C is a free action.

Note: I did not assume at the outset that some free actions don’t require a cause. Rather, I left it open whether or not free actions would be an exception to the general principle that every beginning requires a cause. One can believe that every beginning other than free actions requires a cause without being sure if every free action would require a cause. However, once one follows the above argument, then one may see that some free actions don’t require a cause.

Your beliefs may have further implications. Would you like to Continue?